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THE “BIPARTISAN TRADE DEAL,” TRADE PROMOTION 
AUTHORITY AND THE FUTURE OF U.S. FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS 
DAVID A. GANTZ* 
I.  INTRODUCTION1 
For most of the post-World War II period, the United States has exercised 
leadership in global efforts to achieve freer trade via reductions in tariff and 
non-tariff barriers as well as other available means.  Prior to 1985, these efforts 
focused almost exclusively on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”)2 after the failure by the United States to approve the Havana 
Charter for an International Trade Organization3 and on various subsequent 
negotiating rounds under GATT.  The Truman Administration put the GATT 
into force through a “Protocol of Provisional Application” based on the 
assertion by the United States that existing national legislation authorized 
accepting the GATT commitments.4  While congressional majorities 
eventually supported GATT and the WTO in 1994, the free trade policies of 
the United States have, from time to time, lacked broad support in Congress 
 
* Samuel M. Fegtly Professor of Law and Director, International Trade and Business Law 
Program, the University of Arizona, Rogers College of Law; Associate Director, National Law 
Center for Inter-American Free Trade.  Copyright © 2008, 2009, David A. Gantz.  All rights 
reserved.  The author is grateful for the editing assistance provide by Tracy Weiss, Esq. of the 
Rogers College of Law Class of 2010. 
 1. This article is adapted from parts of several chapters in DAVID A. GANTZ, REGIONAL 
TRADE AGREEMENTS: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE (Carolina Academic Press, 2009) [hereinafter 
GANTZ]. 
 2. See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT], available at http://sul-derivatives.stanford.edu/derivative?CSN 
ID=92290274&mediaType=application/pdf. 
 3. Apparently, the United States failed to approve the Havana Charter because of concerns 
that the Havana Charter and the International Trade Organization that it would have created, 
“would excessively constrain national sovereignty.”  MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT 
HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 23 (3d ed. 2005). 
 4. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF THE GATT 60–63 (1969); Protocol 
of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A2051, 55 U.N.T.S. 308, reprinted in JACKSON, supra, at 882–83. 
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and with the American public.  Never in the post-war period has such support 
seemed as lacking as at the present time. 
The year 1985 marked a pivotal period in U.S. foreign trade policy.  The 
United States began to depart from its long-standing opposition to regional 
trade agreements (“RTAs”).5  Specifically, it adopted a policy that both 
recognized the importance of RTAs and continued to value the role of the 
GATT (now the WTO) in Geneva.  Between 1985 and 2007, the United States 
concluded free trade agreements (“FTAs”)6 with Israel,7 Canada,8 Mexico 
(through NAFTA),9 Jordan,10 Singapore,11 Chile,12  the DR-CAFTA nations 
(Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua),13 Australia,14 Morocco,15 Bahrain,16 Oman,17 Peru,18 Colombia,19 
 
 5. The term “regional trade agreement” is used in this article (and at the WTO) to designate 
trade agreements other than those negotiated globally in Geneva under the auspices of the World 
Trade Organization, whether the RTA is truly regional, like NAFTA or MERCOSUR, or spans 
several continents, such as the United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement. 
 6. A free trade agreement, as defined in GATT, is a regional agreement under the terms of 
which “duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce” on “substantially all trade” are 
eliminated “within a reasonable length of time,” usually ten years.  GATT, supra note 2, art. 
XXIV. 
 7. United States-Israel: Free Trade Area Agreement, U.S.-Isr., Apr. 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 
653, available at http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_0054 
39.asp. 
 8. United States-Canada: Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., Dec. 22, 1987–Jan. 2, 1988, 27 
I.L.M. 281 [hereinafter CFTA] (suspended when NAFTA entered into force). 
 9. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993), available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343&mtpiID=ALL 
[hereinafter NAFTA] (includes full text and annexes). 
 10. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 
(2002), [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan FTA] available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_ 
Agreements/Bilateral/Jordan/asset_ upload_file250_5112.pdf. 
 11. United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S-Sing., May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 
(2003) [hereinafter Singapore FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/ 
Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_file708_4036.pdf. 
 12. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 
(2003) [hereinafter Chile FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/ 
Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_file535_3989.pdf. 
 13. The United States-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-
CAFTA-DR, Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-
DR_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html [hereinafter DR-CAFTA]. 
 14. United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 
1248 (2004) [hereinafter AFTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/ 
Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html. 
 15. United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 
544 (2005) [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_ 
Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/FInal_Text/Section_Index.htm. 
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Panama20 and South Korea.21  All of these FTAs—except those with Panama, 
Colombia and South Korea—have received foreign and congressional approval 
and are in force.  During the same period, the United States also played a 
leading role in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (1986–1994) and has 
participated in the Doha Development Round of WTO negotiations (1991–
present).22 
This article raises the question whether the United States will continue its 
active support of current and future global and regional international trade 
liberalization.  The discussion consists of five additional parts.  Part II focuses 
primarily on the recent political context surrounding U.S. Executive Branch 
efforts to negotiate new trade agreements, particularly FTAs.  Part III discusses 
the evolution of special legislation known as Trade Promotion Authority 
(“TPA”), formerly known as “fast-track,”23 in which the President was 
authorized to negotiate and conclude global and regional trade agreements.  
TPA itself reflects the political complexities of negotiating international 
agreements, including free trade agreements, in a system with a constitutional 
separation of powers structure.  TPA has evolved into an increasingly detailed 
set of negotiating objectives and procedures through which Congress has 
sought to oversee and participate in the trade-negotiating process. 
 
 16. United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Bahr., Sep. 14, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 
(2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Bahrain_FTA/final_texts/ 
Section_Index.html. 
 17. United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Oman, Jan. 19, 2006, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Oman_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html. 
 18. United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, Apr. 12, 2006, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html 
[hereinafter Peru TPA]. 
 19. United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., Nov. 22, 2006, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia_FTA/Final_Text/Section 
_Index.html [hereinafter Colombia FTA] (not in force as of Jan. 2009). 
 20. United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Pan., June 28, 2007, available 
at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Panama_FTA/Final_Text/Section_ 
Index.html [hereinafter Panama TPA] (not in force as of Jan. 2009). 
 21. Free Trade Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea, U.S.-
S.Korea, June 30, 2007, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Republic_ 
of_Korea_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html [hereinafter KORUS] (not in force as of Jan. 
2009). 
 22. The United States has continued its active participation in the Doha Round of 
negotiations at the WTO even after the Trade Promotion Authority expired July 1, 2007.  As of 
early 2009, the Doha discussions are stalled. 
 23. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3801–3813 (2002) (expired 2007). 
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Part IV considers the May 2007 Bipartisan Trade Deal (“BTD”).24  The 
BTD was effectively a refinement, without formal legislative action, of TPA.  
Whether the BTD becomes as ephemeral as TPA remains to be seen.  Part V 
discusses the major stumbling blocks to achieving congressional action on the 
FTAs with Panama, Colombia and South Korea.  Part VI draws conclusions 
for the future of FTA and other trade negotiations by the United States. 
II.  THE POLITICS OF TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Factors Threatening Continued U.S. Leadership in Freer Trade 
The ability of the United States government to conclude international trade 
agreements has weakened since 1995.  The United States remains one of the 
most open markets in the world with a trade-weighted average applied tariff 
rate of 1.6%.  It continues to benefit from trade; eighty percent of all U.S. 
economic growth in 2008–2009 is projected to be derived from exports of 
goods and services, and exports have been climbing at an annual rate of eight 
percent—six times the rate of increase in imports.25  Six hundred forty-two 
billion dollars worth of U.S. imports in 2003 from middle and low-income 
nations continue to support economic development through trade.26  
Nevertheless, long-standing U.S. policy continues to provide extensive 
protection to agriculture commodities, steel, textiles and clothing, among 
others.  Even the nearly $2 billion in annual cotton subsidies that are 
destroying cotton farmers in some African countries do not raise questions of 
fairness for most U.S. lawmakers.27 
Other examples of U.S. protectionism abound.  The provisions in the DR-
CAFTA that provided for an increase of the regional sugar quotas to just over 
one percent of the U.S. market sparked a strong adverse reaction from the U.S. 
sugar industry.28  The apparel provisions attracted intense criticism from textile 
 
 24. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Trade Facts: Bipartisan Trade Deal 
(May 2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2007/asset_ 
upload_file127_11319.pdf [hereinafter BTD]. 
 25. C. Fred Bergsten, Trade Has Saved America from Recession, FIN. TIMES, June 30, 2008, 
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d87f2158-46a4-11dd-876a-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_ 
check=1. 
 26. Ambassador Linnet Deily, Opening Statement at the U.S. Trade Policy Review (Jan. 14, 
2003), available at http://geneva.usmission.gov/press2004/0114DeilyTPR.htm. 
 27. See Jayne Thomisee, The Cotton Debate: A Global Industry Argues Over Government 
Subsidies, 18 WORLDVIEW MAGAZINE (Fall 2005), available at http://www.worldview 
magazine.com/issues/article.cfm?id=163&issue=39. 
 28. See Rossella Brevetti, Costa Rica and U.S. Reach Trade Deal in CAFTA Negotiations, 
21 INT’L TRADE REP. 200 (2004). 
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producers and their workers.29  Despite Australia’s close security and political 
relationship with the United States, the AFTA provides Australia with no 
additional access to the U.S. sugar market and only modestly increases its 
access to U.S. beef and dairy product markets.30  Karl Rove, who then served 
as senior adviser to President Bush, reportedly instructed the U.S. negotiators 
that increased sugar quotas could not be incorporated into the FTA with 
Australia.31 
The U.S. political system is unique when it comes to trade negotiations.  
As one prominent foreign negotiator has observed, “when you negotiate with 
the U.S., you have no choice but to negotiate not only with the administration 
but also with the United States Congress, U.S. business and industry and the 
civil society.”32  The same diplomat noted that the United States also requires 
extensive time to reach consensus at the inter-agency level, to conduct 
necessary consultations with Congress and business interests, and to reflect the 
views of a vibrant civil society.33 
Neither the Republicans nor the Democrats alone bear responsibility for 
the upsurge in protectionist measures.  The 2002 farm bill, which increased 
annual farm subsidies by more than $10 billion annually to a level of about $19 
billion annually and prompted criticism by nations such as Brazil for 
potentially undermining the FTAA negotiations,34 was a broadly bipartisan 
effort.35  Despite Bush administration efforts to convince Congress not to enact 
a farm bill “that moves backward in our trade negotiations” and “contains 
 
 29. See Elizabeth Becker, A Pact on Central American Trade Zone, Minus One, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 18, 2003, at C1. 
 30. See U.S., Australia Reach Deal That Excludes Sugar; Offers Some Beef, Dairy 
Openings, 22 INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Feb. 8, 2004).  Australia currently enjoys a relatively large 
sugar quota of 87,000 tons.  See also Paul Blustein, U.S. and Australia Agree on Free-Trade 
Pact; Bush Administration Maintains Protection Against Sugar, Beef, Dairy Imports, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 9, 2004, at A17. 
 31. See Top Political Advisor Played Role in Removing Sugar from Australia FTA, 22 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE 1 (Feb. 13, 2004). 
 32. Tommy Koh, The USSFTA: A Personal Perspective, in THE UNITED STATES SINGAPORE 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: HIGHLIGHTS AND INSIGHTS 10 (Tommy Koh & Chang Li Lin, eds., 
2004).  Koh was the principal negotiator for Singapore of the FTA. 
 33. Id. at 11–13. 
 34. See Chris Rugaber, Zoellick Defends Farm Bill Against Foreign Critics, Says Other 
Nations Worse, 19 INT’L TRADE REP. 829 (2002) (quoting Reps. Cal Dooley (D-Cal.) and John 
Boehner (R-Ohio) that “[t]here is little doubt that under this bill we will exceed [the $19.1 billion 
limit]”).  Under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, the U.S. limit for trade-distorting subsidies 
is $19.1 million annually, and some believed that the new legislation would result in the United 
States exceeding this limit.  Id. 
 35. See Derrick Cain, Farm Bill Conferees Complete Details; House, Senate Likely to Vote 
This Week, 19 INT’L TRADE REP. 784 (2002) (quoting then Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle 
(D-S.D.) as indicating that Democrats would overwhelmingly support the bill). 
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elements that are going to get challenged” in the WTO,36 the Food, 
Conservation and Energy Act of 200837 was enacted over the President’s veto 
with huge bipartisan margins.38  The generous farm subsidy program, which 
may well lead to “Amber Box” subsidy levels above the U.S. scheduled 
commitments, received support not just from the expected congressional 
delegations and senators from farm states, but also from many congressional 
representatives of urban areas.39  The latter group supported the Act because it 
included increases in funds available for nutrition programs such as food 
stamps, school lunches, and such environmental measures as reducing 
pollution in Chesapeake Bay.40  The $307 billion package included over $70 
billion for five years of expanded farm subsidies despite record grain prices 
and farm income.41 
A few high administration officials, including at various times Office of 
the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) Ambassador Zoellick, 
Deputy USTR Peter Allgeier and Under Secretary of Commerce Grant 
Aldonas, demonstrated an unquestioned commitment to free trade from 1995 
to 2005.  A broader commitment within the U.S. government has often been 
lacking despite regular—if at times dispassionate—support from President 
Bush.  Since 2005, enthusiasm for freer trade has further eroded as a result of 
disillusionment over the WTO’s Doha Round and the failed Free Trade 
Agreement of the Americas (“FTAA”) negotiations.  Even in its current 
relations with Mexico, the U.S. Government has focused on relatively minor 
“tweaking” of the NAFTA relationship.  The current discourse of the 
“Partnership for Security and Prosperity” indicates no support—except perhaps 
in Mexico—for wider and deeper economic integration in North America.42 
 
 36. USDA Chief Says Administration-Congress Talks on Farm Bill Advance, 26 INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE (Feb. 11, 2008) (quoting Agriculture Secretary Ed Schafer). 
 37. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, 112 Stat. 1651 
(2008). 
 38. David Stout, Farm Bill, in Part and in Full, Wins Passage, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at 
A23.  The vote was 82-13 in the Senate and 316-108 in the House of Representatives.  Id. 
 39. Erik Wasson, New Farm Bill Program Complicates Compliance With U.S. Doha Offer, 
26 INSIDE U.S. TRADE 1, 24–25 (2008). 
 40. See Derrick Cain, Senate Approves $288 Billion Farm Bill by Veto-Proof Margin; White 
House Softens, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 1795 (2007) (discussing the various provisions of the senate 
bill). 
 41. Letter from Peter Orszag, Director, Congressional Budget Office, to Senator Tom 
Harkin, Chairman, Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry (May 13, 2008), available 
at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/92xx/doc9230/hr2419conf.pdf.  See also, Jan Biles, Shortcomings 
Seen in $290 Billion Farm Bill, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, May 16, 2008, available at 
http://www.cjonline.com/stories/051608/bus_279578300.shtml. 
 42. Rossella Brevetti, NAFTA Leaders Agree to Steps to Boost Competitiveness, Fight IP 
Piracy, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 1213 (2007) (discussing the results of a meeting of NAFTA 
presidents in Canada). 
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The United States is best at approving major trade agreements such as 
NAFTA, the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations and the WTO accession 
agreement with China when both political and economic imperatives exist to 
do so.  Even the most free-trade-oriented U.S. administrations will likely fail to 
overcome the domestic political opposition that typically pervades negotiations 
unless there is both enormous pressure from the business community to move 
forward, and some semblance of bipartisan support in Congress.  One scholar, 
Peter Kleen, has opined that a “critical factor” for success in trade negotiations 
is strong support from the business community and civil society: “[A]ll parts of 
society—not just trade officials—must be committed to furthering multilateral 
trade liberalization.”43 
During most of the mid to late 1990s, the major concern of business, for 
perfectly good economic reasons, was assuring WTO membership for China 
and supporting the conclusion of the WTO’s Information Technology 
Agreement.  Hence, the collective U.S. business community never appeared 
either solidly behind the FTAA or significantly concerned with efforts by the 
Clinton and Bush administrations to conclude FTAs with small trading nations 
in Latin America or the Middle East.44 
It is also unfair to criticize former President Clinton too strongly for not 
pushing forward with the FTAA, or with the Chile and Singapore FTAs, given 
his earlier strong support for the passage of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round 
agreements.  Two of his major constituencies—the labor unions and 
environmentalists—generally have opposed freer trade.  Few top level officials 
in either the Clinton administration (except those noted above) or the 
Republican Congress were prepared to publicly tout the benefits of freer trade, 
and the business community sat on its hands. 
When President Clinton finally proposed negotiations with Chile and 
Singapore during the last several months of his administration, the objective 
articulated by U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky was a 
circumscribed form of FTA resembling the U.S. FTA with Jordan, rather than 
a comprehensive agreement such as NAFTA.45  The U.S.-Jordan FTA 
 
 43. Press Release, Peter Kleen, European Center for International Political Economy, So 
Alike and Yet so Different: A Comparison of the Uruguay Round and the Doha Round (Apr. 1, 
2008), available at http://www.ecipe.org/press/PressreleasePeterKleen_SoAlikeandYetso 
Different.pdf. 
 44. As a National Association of Manufacturers vice president said after one of the 
inconclusive FTAA negotiating sessions, “This is not what we wanted, and we have serious 
concerns, . . . [b]ut the alternative, allowing the talks to collapse because a way could not be 
found to bridge the gap with Brazil, would have been a disaster for all.”  NAM Lends Support to 
FTAA Declaration, CALTRADE REP., Nov. 19, 2003, available at http://www.caltradereport.com/ 
eWebPages/in-brief-1070318863.html. 
 45. Ralph F. Ives, The USSFTA: Personal Perspectives on the Process and Results, in THE 
UNITED STATES SINGAPORE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: HIGHLIGHTS AND INSIGHTS, supra note 
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incorporated labor and environmental provisions acceptable to many members 
of the Democratic Party in Congress (but opposed by the Republicans) that the 
Clinton administration wanted to lock in for future FTAs.46  Clinton 
administration officials also thought—wrongly as it turned out—that they 
could complete a short and simple agreement with Singapore and Chile within 
the last few months of the administration.47 
The Bush administration, under the direction of Ambassador Zoellick, 
opted to pursue instead an FTA model based on NAFTA, a “comprehensive, 
world-class agreement” as one of the U.S. negotiators termed it.48  The 
NAFTA-like Chile and Singapore FTAs ultimately became the templates for 
the many U.S. FTAs that followed, with appropriate modifications to deal with 
an individual country’s situation.  The negotiations could not be completed 
until the enactment of TPA in August 2002.  Notably, despite the 
administration’s decision to offer “safeguards” to the domestic steel industry, 
TPA passed in the House of Representatives by only three votes after a long 
and sometimes acrimonious debate.49 
In recent years “outsourcing” increasingly has become a campaign issue at 
the congressional and senatorial level, though the focus of concern has 
primarily remained China and India, rather than the U.S. FTA partners.  The 
overseas migration of perhaps 250,000 to 500,000 high-paying service jobs 
over the past few years to countries such as India seems to have had a 
disproportionate effect on traditional supporters of free trade in business, 
Congress and the Executive Branch.  Perhaps this is because, as some have 
suggested, their neighbors are directly affected by the loss of these positions; 
but in any event, it is unsettling.50  Much of this criticism may be misplaced 
and illogical.  As Professor Jagdish Bhagwati has observed, sending such 
service jobs overseas is “no different than importing labor-intensive textiles 
and other goods.”51  While this may prove true, many U.S. policy makers and 
the public perceive the offshore movement of jobs as a threat. 
 
32, at 23, 25.  Ives was the principal U.S. negotiator for the Singapore FTA.  (The Jordan FTA 
model had nineteen articles rather than twenty-two chapters, as in NAFTA.) 
 46. Koh, supra note 32, at 15 (discussing the differences in approach between the Clinton 
and Bush administrations). 
 47. Ives, supra note 45, at 25. 
 48. Id. 
 49. 19 U.S.C. § 3801 (2002); Rossella Brevetti, Fawn Johnson & Brett Ferguson, Bush Signs 
TPA Bill After Senate Approval, Will Pursue Free Trade with Other Nations, 19 INT’L TRADE 
REP. 1369, 1378 (2002) (noting that the House vote was 215-212 and the Senate approved TPA 
by a vote of 64-34). 
 50. Bob Davis, Migration of Skilled Jobs Abroad Unsettles Global-Economy Fans, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 26, 2004, at A1.  Such concerns were apparently raised repeatedly at Davos, 
Switzerland, in January 2004, by persons who are overwhelmingly free traders. 
 51. Jagdish Bhagwati, Op-Ed., Why Your Job Isn’t Moving to Bangalore, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
15, 2004, at 11. 
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Given this climate, public support for freer trade declined even during the 
consistent, if limited, economic expansion during most of the period between 
2000 and 2007.  During this time, at least forty percent of Americans believed 
that trade barriers were being lowered too quickly, even though most favored 
increased trade in principle.52  Even on the Republican side, views have been 
divided.  Recent polls indicate a belief among a significant majority of 
Republican voters that free trade is bad for the economy.53  In the Senate, 
which is traditionally more free-trade oriented than the House, it is possible to 
obtain significant majorities for politically popular anti-trade actions that are 
flagrantly in violation of U.S. obligations under regional trade agreements.  For 
example, in September 2007, the Senate passed by a 74-24 margin an 
amendment to an appropriations bill that denied funds to the Department of 
Transportation to fund a pilot program permitting Mexican trucks to carry 
international cargos into the United States.54  The U.S. government has delayed 
implementation of this obligation for nearly twelve years on largely spurious 
safety and environmental grounds. President Bush effectively refused to 
implement blocking legislation, but the fledgling pilot program was blocked by 
U.S. legislation in March 2009.55 
Also in 2007, several Democratic senators reportedly actively discouraged 
the citizens of Costa Rica—the only DR-CAFTA nation that had not approved 
the FTA—from voting in favor of the Agreement in a national referendum.  
The senators provided very public support to anti-DR-CAFTA forces in Costa 
Rica,56 notwithstanding the BTD.  Costa Ricans ultimately approved DR-
CAFTA.57  This only occurred, however, after an unseemly debate between the 
Bush administration and some Democratic members of Congress, during 
which the administration warned Costa Rica both that it would not renegotiate 
the agreement and that continued access to Caribbean Basin Initiative 
unilateral tariff preferences should not be assumed.  At the same time, the 
 
 52. Gary G. Yerkey, President Bush’s Handling of Trade Issues Seen as Negative for Re-
election Prospects, 21 INT’L TRADE REP. 173, 181 (2004). 
 53. John Harwood, Republicans Grow Skeptical on Free Trade, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 4, 2007, 
at A1. 
 54. Karen L. Werner, Senate Adopts Dorgan Amendment Prohibiting Mexican Truck 
Program, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 1270 (2007) (reporting on the Senate vote).  Mexican truck 
access to the border-states was required as of December 1995.  NAFTA, supra note 9, Annex I-
U-18. 
 55. DOT to Continue Mexican Truck Project Despite Spending Prohibition, 26 INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE (Jan. 4, 2008) (explaining the Bush administration position that the prohibition does not 
apply to the pilot program established in September 2007).  See Editorial, A Small and Dangerous 
Spat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at A30 (decrying the protectionism reflected in the ban). 
 56. Mary Anastasia O’Grady, Op-Ed., Democrats vs. Central America, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 
2007, at A22. 
 57. Gary G. Yerkey & Amy Tsui, U.S. Welcomes Costa Rica’s CAFTA Approval; Passage 
of FTA Neutralizes CBI Controversy, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 1435 (2007). 
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Democrats, many of whom remain generally opposed to free trade agreements 
and unilateral tariff preferences despite the BTD, countered that the unilateral 
tariff benefits might be continued even if Costa Rica voted “no.”58 
One thus sees a basic, not necessarily logical, shift away from the United 
States’ post-World War II support for increased trade through new trade 
agreements and reduced tariff and non-tariff barriers.  Whether such opposition 
will be short-lived or will deepen as a result of Obama administration and 
congressional policies cannot be determined at this time, in part, because of the 
protectionist pressures generated by the worldwide recession. 
B. Prospects and Concerns for 2009 and Beyond 
In 2008 continuing into 2009, several factors made it difficult for the 
United States to exercise the leadership and make the compromises necessary 
to rescue the floundering WTO Doha Round trade negotiations.  These factors 
have included not only general public concerns with free trade and 
uncertainties over the costs and extent of U.S. farm subsidies in the new Act, 
but also the expiration of TPA.  The difficulties surrounding the Doha Round 
negotiations would exist even if the United States had been able to provide 
strong support for moving forward, since none of the major participants—the 
European Union, India, China and Brazil among—had the political will in 
2008 to support a successful conclusion to these negotiations.59  They likely 
will not have the necessary support in 2009 either.  Nor does it seem likely that 
the United States will initiate any new FTAs beyond the group already 
concluded under TPA even though changes could be made that would make 
the agreements more consistent with Democratic congressional views on trade 
policy.60 
Eventual approval of the pending FTAs with Colombia, Panama and South 
Korea depends not only on the agreement-specific factors discussed in Part V 
but also on the linkage between congressional approval of the FTAs and 
congressional enactment of Trade Adjustment Assistance (“TAA”).  The 
connection between supporting free trade through the FTAs and protecting 
U.S. workers who lose their jobs because of foreign competition is particularly 
 
 58. Editorial, Victory for Costa Rica: The Central American Democracy Approves Free 
Trade with the United States, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2007, at A16.  The benefits are provided under 
the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (“CBERA”).  19 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000). 
 59. The most recent effort to revive the Doha Round discussions collapsed at the end of July 
2008, ostensibly over the refusal of India to agree to a package without the inclusion of new 
protection for its farm sector.  See Anthony Faiola & Rama Lakshmi, Trade Talks Crumble in 
Feud Over Farm Aid, WASH. POST, July 30, 2008, at A1 (discussing the reasons for the collapse 
and the impact on future trade negotiations). 
 60. Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Politics Dim Renewal of WTO Talks on Farm Trade; EU Warns U.S. 
on Subsidies, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 1232 (2007) (discussing the effect of U.S. political constraints 
on the Doha negotiations). 
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important both in an election year and at a time when the U.S. job losses are 
mounting because of the recession.  Among other considerations, TAA 
provides some “cover” to pro-trade members of Congress who may be vilified 
if they support FTAs.  Thus, it is not surprising that Senate Finance Chairman 
Max Baucus—historically a strong supporter of freer trade—indicated that he 
was willing to consider other trade bills in 2008 only after Congress enacts a 
“strong” trade adjustment assistance package.61  (TAA was not enacted in 2008 
and none of the pending FTAs were approved, but TAA seems likely to be 
enacted in 2009.) 
With very few exceptions, advocacy of freer trade policies did not likely 
help any candidate, Democrat or Republican, win presidential, senate or house 
elections in November 2008 even though such positions may have stimulated 
financial support from the business community.  Thus, being labeled as pro-
trade has more downside risk than upside benefit.  This has been the situation 
for at least the last four years.62  During the 2008 presidential election, now 
President Barack Obama initially adopted a cautiously positive position on 
trade issues.  Specifically, he indicated a realization that globalization will not 
go away, which meant that the United States must prepare to deal with both its 
advantages and disadvantages.  He has also supported efforts to enable U.S. 
workers and enterprises, particularly the high-technology variety, to compete 
more effectively against foreign workers.63  In the primary season, Obama’s 
primary rival, then Senator Hillary Clinton, advocated “smart trade” and a 
“time out” on future U.S. trade agreements, as well as possible reconsideration 
of NAFTA.64 Both major Democratic Party candidates and many other 
politicians supported U.S. auto industry opposition to the FTA with South 
Korea.65 
Beginning with the debates leading up to the Ohio presidential primary, 
Clinton and Obama were extremely critical of NAFTA, each threatening to opt 
out of NAFTA unless Mexico and Canada agreed to renegotiate.  They both 
suggested, without offering any evidence, that the improved enforcement of 
labor and environmental laws in Mexico that they promised to seek in a 
renegotiated NAFTA would somehow restore lost manufacturing jobs in Ohio, 
 
 61. Baucus Says TAA Must Precede Other Trade Bills; Markup in Coming Weeks, 26 INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE 1, 7 (2008). 
 62. Yerkey, supra note 52. 
 63. David Ranson, Op-Ed., The Candidates and Trade, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 6, 2008, at A19. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Editorial, Korean Boon?, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Aug. 12, 2007, available at 
http://www.pe.com/localnews/opinion/editorials/stories/PE_OpEd_Opinion_D_op_13_ed_sokotr
ade1.5527a9.html# (criticizing “top Democrats” for pandering to the big labor interests in the 
United States by opposing KORUS). 
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Pennsylvania and elsewhere.66  Neither explained why Canada and Mexico—
respectively the number one and number four sources of U.S. petroleum 
imports—would be prepared to renegotiate NAFTA without the negotiations 
addressing issues of interest to them as well as matters of concern to the United 
States. 
Senator McCain, the Republican nominee, expressed a very different point 
of view, seeing free trade as a “continuing principle that guides this nation’s 
economy” and advocating reducing ethanol and other agricultural subsidies.67  
In the past Senator McCain supported NAFTA, as well as the pending FTA 
with South Korea, and vehemently rejected renegotiation of NAFTA, 
characterizing NAFTA as a “fundamental necessity if our economy’s going to 
improve.”68 
Later in the campaign, President Obama’s views moderated.  He endorsed 
an increase in U.S. assistance to the Americas and pledged to continue 
supporting the counter-drug program and anti-terrorist U.S. aid to Colombia, 
although still opposing the FTA “because the needs of workers were not 
adequately addressed.”69  In partial response to criticism from Senator McCain, 
President Obama withdrew his unilateral demand for renegotiation of NAFTA 
“or else,” calling instead for a “dialogue” with Mexico and Canada to address 
job losses associated with NAFTA, and he asserted that “I’m not a big believer 
in just doing things unilaterally.”70  The President’s commitment to “upgrade” 
NAFTA was reiterated in a meeting with Mexican President Calderon in mid-
January 2009 although he also advocated “port of entry modernization and 
improvements on the Mexican border to facilitate legal trade and commerce.”71 
The principal risk in the heated campaign was that the Democratic 
candidates would stake out positions using rhetoric that frightened our trading 
partners at the time and make it more difficult in 2009 for either President 
Obama or Congress to follow responsible international economic policies 
without appearing to repudiate campaign promises.  The posturing may well 
 
 66. Gary G. Yerkey, Clinton, Obama Vow to ‘Opt Out’ of NAFTA Unless Mexico, Canada 
Agree to Renegotiate, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. 349 (2008). 
 67. Ranson, supra note 63. 
 68. Gary G. Yerkey, Sen. McCain Opposes Reopening NAFTA, Calls Free Trade, 25 INT’L 
TRADE REP. 923 (2008) (quoting Senator McCain at a news conference). 
 69. Senator Barack Obama, Renewing U.S. Leadership in the Americas, Address to Cuban 
American National Foundation (May 23, 2008), available at http://www.barackobama.com/ 
2008/05/23/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_68.php. 
 70. Gary G. Yerkey, Sen. Obama Calls for Dialogue With Canada, Mexico to Fix ‘Costs’ of 
NAFTA, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. 958 (2008). 
 71. Obama Pitches "Consultative Group" on NAFTA to Mexican President, 27 INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE 2 (Jan. 16, 2009).  When I addressed an American Chamber of Commerce group in 
Santiago in March 2008, there were concerns that the Obama/Clinton threats of NAFTA 
renegotiation would result in a demand for renegotiation of the U.S.-Chile FTA as well. 
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“remove the United States from any significant international trade negotiations 
in the foreseeable future,” as C. Fred Bergsten has warned.72  Perhaps more 
likely, it may simply complicate governing for the Democratic congressional 
leadership and for President Obama in 2009 and beyond. 
For some foreign nations, particularly in Latin America, U.S. international 
economic policy is just as important as U.S. international security policy.  
Arrogant and unilateral demands on trade issues can undermine U.S. 
credibility in the world and ultimately work against broader U.S. interests, just 
as they have on international security issues in recent years.73  Causing stalwart 
U.S. allies such as Chile to worry that President Obama would seek revision of 
trade agreements even if no one has publicly mentioned Chile in that context, 
is hardly the best way to build U.S. economic and political influence in Latin 
America.74  As a former Mexican foreign minister has observed, “What does 
Mexico or Chile care about who rules in Baghdad?  [The Iraq War] was about 
how the world’s superpower wields its power.  That’s something we all deeply 
care about.”75 
One of the ironies of this misplaced criticism of NAFTA and, by 
implication, other FTAs is that even FTAs such as NAFTA, with its more than 
$900 billion worth of annual intra-regional trade, have relatively minor 
economic impact on the U.S. economy as a whole76 despite the fact that they 
cause pain at the micro level when jobs are lost.  Subsequent FTAs cover only 
a fraction of the amount of trade under NAFTA and thus have no measurable 
impact on the U.S. economy as a whole.  However, for small, developing 
countries, particularly those with only a few major export products, the impact 
may be enormous and beneficial.  This means that FTAs with developing 
countries can be a useful tool for encouraging global free trade, democratic 
institutions, the rule of law and other major U.S. foreign policy objectives 
without any appreciable cost to the U.S. economy as a whole.77 
 
 72. C. Fred Bergsten, Op-Ed., The Democrats’ Dangerous Trade Games, WALL ST. J., May 
20, 2008, at A23. 
 73. Andrés Oppenheimer, Op-Ed., Dems’ Free Trade Rhetoric Could Harm U.S., ARIZ. 
DAILY STAR, Mar. 4, 2008, available at http://www.azstarnet.com/sn/byauthor/227963 (noting 
the inaccuracies of the NAFTA criticism and how such statements play in Latin American nations 
such as Colombia). 
 74. When I spoke to an American Chamber of Commerce group in Santiago on March 14, 
2008, this was one of the major questions among businesses represented there. 
 75. Jorge Castañada, quoted in FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICAN WORLD 228 
(2008). 
 76. J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NAFTA AT TEN: LESSONS FROM RECENT 
STUDIES, 2–4 (2004) (concluding that NAFTA slightly increased U.S. GDP growth by roughly 
0.04%, had little impact on aggregate U.S. employment and modestly stimulated U.S.-Mexico 
trade and U.S. investment in Mexico). 
 77. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE PROS AND CONS OF PURSUING FREE-TRADE AGREEMENTS 
1, 7 (2003).  There is some cost in terms of loss of tariff revenues and providing technical 
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Three months after the 2008 election the Obama Administration’s 
international trade policy directions were still difficult to discern without a 
clearer crystal ball than the author’s; early signals are mixed.  On the positive 
side, the President’s senior economic adviser, Lawrence Summers and his 
Secretary of the Treasury, Timothy Geithner, are among other economic 
advisers known to favor centrist economics and open markets.78  However, 
within forty-eight hours of the Inauguration, Mr. Geithner (presumably 
reflecting the President’s views) intentionally stepped up the rhetoric in 
accusing the Chinese of currency manipulation,79 an approach that is at least 
somewhat risky given that U.S. imports of Chinese goods are slowing, China 
remains a major creditor of the United States and China’s cooperation will be 
needed to deal with the world recession and future global trade negotiations. 
Former senator Hillary Clinton, hardly a supporter of an open trade policy, 
as the presidential primaries indicated, is now Secretary of State and likely will 
be one of the most powerful members of the Cabinet.  According to reports, 
Clinton told United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”) 
officials, “I wanted to come here today with a very simple message . . . I 
believe in development, and I believe with all my heart that it truly is an equal 
partner, along with defense and diplomacy, in the furtherance of American’s 
national security.80  It is difficult to imagine a successful development policy 
that does not depend at least in part on encouraging developing nation trade 
and affording such nations access to the U.S. market. 
In contrast, another prominent member of in the Cabinet, Secretary of 
Labor, Hilda Solis, has adopted the anti-trade sentiments of her constituencies, 
including strong opposition to NAFTA.81  The President’s first choice for U.S. 
Trade Representative, Congressman Xavier Becerra, declined on the grounds 
that trade policy would not be a priority for the Obama administration; the 
confirmed USTR, Ron Kirk of Texas, is known to have pro-trade views, at 
least on NAFTA, but his lack of trade credentials is initially disappointing to 
those who hoped for a trade expert in the USTR position.82 
 
assistance, but these are usually minimal, since under various existing preference programs, most 
imports from FTA partner countries already enter the United States duty-free. 
 78. Trineesh Biswas, How is President Obama Likely to Deal with Trade?, International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, vol. 12, no. 6, Dec. 2008, at 2, available at 
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 79. Lory Montgomery & Anthony Fiola, Geithner Says China Manipulates Its Currency, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2009, at A08 (quoting Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner). 
 80. Clinton Pledges More Support for Development Aid, RTT NEWS, Jan. 23, 2009, 
available at http://www.rttnews.com/Content/Policy.aspx?Id=833193. 
 81. Jagdish Bhagwati, Obama and Trade: an Alarm Sounds, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 9, 
2009, at 9. 
 82. Id. 
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Still, Senators Obama, Clinton and McCain supported the Peruvian Trade 
Promotion Agreement in December 2007.83  They were not alone.  The BTD 
between the Bush administration and the Democratic congressional leadership 
apparently resolved key issues of disagreement regarding labor and 
environment, and lesser concerns relating to investment, intellectual property 
and national security.  Once the deal was concluded in May 2007,84 a 
significant number of Democrats in Congress joined Republicans in passing 
the necessary implementing legislation for the Peru Trade Promotion 
Agreement (“PTPA”).85  It remains unclear whether this was just an aberration 
or whether such action on PTPA will be followed by similar action on some or 
all of the other pending FTAs in 2009. 
President Obama, whether one characterizes the ensuing process as a “time 
out” as Senator Clinton has done, will inevitably require a period of four to six 
months during which he assembles an economic policy team and devises a set 
of policies including those related to global and regional trade agreements.  
This is entirely reasonable; there is no reason to assume that the Bush 
administration trade policies are necessarily the best ones for the country or 
should not be substantially altered after nearly eight years without major 
review.  Still, the infrequency of any public statements of support by the 
President or presidential advisers for the importance of maintaining an open 
trading system and completing the Doha Round in Geneva is troubling.86  
Moreover, judging by initial legislative efforts, Congress is likely to be much 
more interested in strengthening U.S. trade remedies against actual or 
imagined “unfair trade,” seeking redress of foreign market restrictions through 
enforcement rather than through trade negotiations87 and enacting “Buy 
American” provisions in economic stimulus legislation.  Many believe that 
such provisions are inconsistent with recent U.S. pledges to refrain from 
raising new trade and investment barriers if not with WTO obligations, and 
could encourage other major nations to follow suit.88 
As President Obama recognizes, the economic challenges of globalization 
and declining world trade, including but not limited to the world financial 
 
 83. How Have Clinton, McCain, and Obama Been Voting on Trade Issues?, The Custom-
House, Feb. 3, 2008, http://benmuse.typepad.com/custom_house/2008/02/how-have-clinto.html. 
 84. BTD, supra note 24. 
 85. Peru TPA, supra note 18, art. 17.1.  See GANTZ, supra note 1, ch. 9. 
 86. Bhagwati, supra note 81. 
 87. See H.R. 496, The Trade Enforcement Act of 2009, Jan. 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.insidetrade.com/secure/pdf13/wto2009_0254b.pdf (advocating various legislative and 
administrative actions to eliminate foreign trade barriers and “restore and enhance” U.S. trade 
remedies). 
 88. See Amy Tsui, Business Groups Urge Congress to Reject “Buy American” in Stimulus 
Bill, 26 INT’L TRADE REP. 147, Jan. 29, 2009 (reporting on business group testimony before 
Congress). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
130 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII:115 
crisis and the first likely decrease in world trade in twenty-five years,89 will 
dominate 2009 and perhaps the several years beyond.  Even if the President 
moves slowly in deciding what to do with global trade negotiations and the 
pending FTAs, he will face the need to develop a rational policy to react to the 
new FTAs that will likely be concluded by other major trading nations such as 
the EU, China, and South Korea, and with protectionist actions (whether or not 
WTO illegal) elsewhere designed to protect local jobs at the expense of 
imports.90  These challenges are in addition to pressing international economic 
issues related to the declining value of the dollar, high oil prices and the 
troubled U.S. economic relationship with China.  Thus, even if the pessimists 
on trade have misjudged the President, the prospect of at least a period of not-
so-benign neglect of international trade issues seems real. 
Most of the U.S. FTAs, particularly those with small, developing nations, 
will meet their trade and development objectives only with both technical 
assistance and frequent encouragement from the United States.  This is 
especially true in the areas of transparency and in assuring the availability of 
administrative and judicial courts for customs and commercial disputes and 
intellectual property enforcement.  Also, President Obama has an opportunity 
under all of the existing FTAs to provide financial assistance and 
encouragement, along with diplomatic pressure as needed.  Such steps would 
likely lead to better observation of labor rights and enforcement of 
environmental laws.  If, as seems likely, any U.S. effort to renegotiate NAFTA 
is recognized as impractical, a good alternative would be to improve the 
functioning of existing labor and environmental provisions. 
III.  TRADE PROMOTION/FAST-TRACK NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY 
Despite the efforts of U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab to continue 
negotiations in Geneva throughout 2007 and 2008, TPA expired June 30, 2007, 
drastically curtailing U.S. negotiating authority.  The window of opportunity 
for concluding the Doha Round, the FTAA and new bilateral FTAs has 
effectively closed, likely to re-open only in 2010 or later.  Since the first fast-
track legislation was enacted in 1974,91 Congress periodically has provided 
presidents with TPA, known as “fast-track” until 2002, in recognition of the 
 
 89. The World Bank has predicted that global trade will decrease by 2.1% in 2009. World 
Bank, Historic commodity price boom ends with slowing global growth, Dec. 9, 2008, available 
at http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/0,,contentMDK:22004555~pageP 
K:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:469372,00.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2009). 
 90. The decision to subsidize the American “Big Three” auto producers, while in the 
author’s view a wise economic policy decision under the circumstances, nevertheless sends the 
wrong signal to other WTO member governments. 
 91. Trade Act of 1974, Publ. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 
2101–2497 (2000)). 
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importance of trade to national security and economic growth.92  TPA has 
occasionally been withheld, most recently after July 1, 2007, and from May 
1994 until August 2002. The only major U.S. trade agreement to be 
successfully concluded without fast-track authority was the Jordan FTA in 
1999.93  Congress refused to approve the implementing legislation for that 
FTA until just after September 11, 2001, when political and security issues in 
the Middle East triumphed over trade considerations.94 
Still, the expired version of TPA warrants exploration given the probability 
that when and if TPA is renewed, it will resemble the 2002 version, likely with 
changes reflecting the BTD and other developments since 2007. 
A. General Considerations 
For eminently practical reasons, most foreign governments are unwilling to 
complete substantive trade negotiations with the United States in the absence 
of TPA.  Under TPA, Congress has limited its authority so that it may only 
vote “yes” or “no” on a trade agreement.  Congress can neither amend any 
provisions nor unduly delay consideration of the agreement and the 
implementing legislation once the President has submitted it to the Congress.95  
In the absence of TPA, Congress has the ability to demand amendment of a 
trade agreement so as to make the agreement more attractive to Congress and 
inevitably less attractive to the foreign governments,96 or it may simply delay 
action indefinitely.  Logically enough, foreign governments want to avoid both 
of these negative effects.  The Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations most 
clearly illustrated this problem, as Congress declined to vote on two of the 
major negotiated components, prompting anger by the European Communities 
and a pledge that they would not negotiate again with the United States without 
assurances that such a result would not happen again.97 
TPA is not a one-way street.  In return for agreeing to limit debate and 
conduct only an up-or-down vote without amendments, Congress imposes 
detailed substantive criteria on the President for conducting trade negotiations.  
In addition, TPA requires the President to obtain permission, in a process that 
effectively permits a congressional veto, before he may negotiate each specific 
 
 92. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 107-624, at 149–150 (2002) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that the 
expansion of international trade is vital to U.S. world leadership).  For an excellent and 
exhaustive discussion of TPA/Fast-Track, see HAL S. SHAPIRO, FAST TRACK: A LEGAL, 
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (2006). 
 93. U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 10. 
 94. See GANTZ, supra note 1, ch. 8. 
 95. 19 U.S.C. § 3805(b)(2) (Supp. 2002). 
 96. See Leslie Alan Glick, World Trade After September 11, 2001: The U.S. Response, 35 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 627, 637–38 (2002) (discussing Congress’ opposition, on constitutional and 
other grounds, to TPA because of these limitations on congressional power). 
 97. Bergsten, supra note 25. 
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agreement.98  Moreover, consultations with Congress are required throughout 
the negotiating process.  The agreement must be presented to Congress at least 
ninety days before either the President or his delegate may sign it.99  
Congressional consideration does not begin until the President transmits the 
final agreement to Congress.  The agreement must be accompanied by a 
complete draft of the implementing legislation and a “Statement of 
Administrative Action” explaining what changes in U.S. law are required and 
demonstrating that the agreement is consistent with the stated negotiating 
objectives in the TPA legislation.100 
TPA also provides for a study by the U.S. International Trade Commission 
(“USITC”) of the economic impact on the United States of each FTA.  With 
regard to labor and environmental language in trade agreements, TPA directs 
the President to create consultative mechanisms to promote respect for core 
ILO labor standards and for protection of the environment and human health.  
Consultations also are required with prospective FTA partners on labor laws, 
with the provision of technical assistance if needed, and all include various 
review and reporting requirements.101  An environmental impact assessment is 
also required, as are a series of trade advisory committee reports, including, but 
not limited to, labor and environmental issues.102 
TPA is not a panacea.  With one recent exception, a president has never 
sent an FTA to Congress knowing that there was a strong likelihood that it 
would be disapproved. However, Bush administration officials became 
frustrated when the Democratic Congress in late 2007 and early 2008 
effectively stalled the FTAs with Panama, Colombia and South Korea by 
implicitly or explicitly threatening disapproval. Accordingly, President Bush 
decided to send the Colombia FTA forward to Congress without having 
consulted on implementing legislation and despite uncertainties about whether 
there were sufficient votes for enactment in the Congress; this may well 
produce the first such disapproval.103  The immediate, also unprecedented 
congressional reaction, was to change the rules of the House of 
Representatives, obviating the need to vote on the Colombia FTA within 
ninety legislative days and instead permitting the House to vote on the FTA at 
 
 98. 19 U.S.C. § 3803 (Supp. 2002). 
 99. 19 U.S.C. § 3805(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 2002). 
 100. 19 U.S.C. § 3805(a)(1)(C) (Supp. 2002). 
 101. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(c) (Supp. 2002). 
 102. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3802(c), 3804(e) (Supp. 2002). 
 103. President George W. Bush, Remarks on the Colombia Free Trade Agreement (Apr. 7, 
2008), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/07/AR2008 
040700999_pf.html (announcing his intention to send the FTA immediately to Congress so as to 
force a vote by the end of the session). 
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a time of its choosing.104  The stalemate between President Bush and the 
Democratic Congress continued through the remainder of President Bush’s 
second term, with the fate of the Colombia FTA in limbo as of early 2009, as 
discussed in Part V, infra. 
B. Negotiating Objectives of TPA (2002) 
The “Trade Negotiation Objectives” in the Trade Act of 2002 were 
designed to guide U.S. trade policy.  They were applicable to trade agreements 
that were negotiated beginning August 6, 2002, and that were signed by March 
31, 2007.105  That group included the then-ongoing Chile, Singapore, FTAA 
and WTO negotiations, and subsequent FTAs concluded within ninety days of 
June 30, 2007, which was the day TPA expired.106  The latter group included 
FTAs with Australia, Bahrain, DR-CAFTA, Colombia, Morocco, Oman, 
Panama and South Korea.  The focus in this discussion is on the most 
controversial provisions, which affected investment protection, labor and the 
environment. 
1. Overall Negotiating Objectives 
 The following were among the “Overall trade negotiating objectives”: 
(1) to obtain more open, equitable, and reciprocal market access; 
(2) to obtain the reduction or elimination of barriers and distortions that are 
directly related to trade and that decrease market opportunities for United 
States exports or otherwise distort United States trade; 
(3) to further strengthen the system of international trading disciplines and 
procedures, including dispute settlement; 
(4) to foster economic growth, raise living standards, and promote full 
employment in the United States and to enhance the global economy; 
(5) to ensure that trade and environmental policies are mutually supportive and 
to seek to protect and preserve the environment and enhance the international 
means of doing so, while optimizing the use of the world’s resources; 
(6) to promote respect for worker rights and the rights of children consistent 
with core labor standards of the ILO . . . and an understanding of the 
relationship between trade and worker rights; 
 
 104. House Approves Fast-Track Rules Change for U.S.-Colombia FTA, 26 INSIDE U.S. 
TRADE (Apr. 11, 2008).  TPA “expressly recognizes the constitutional right of either House to 
change the rules” (so far as relating to the procedures of that House) at any time, in the same 
manner, and to the same extent as any other rule of that House. 19 U.S.C. § 3805(c)(2) (Supp. 
2002).  That is what the House did. 
 105. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3802–3803 (Supp. 2002). 
 106. 19 U.S.C. §§ 3805, 3806 (Supp. 2002). 
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(7) to seek provisions in trade agreements under which parties to those 
agreements strive to ensure that they do not weaken or reduce the protections 
afforded in domestic environmental and labor laws as an encouragement for 
trade; 
(8) to ensure that trade agreements afford small businesses equal access to 
international markets, equitable trade benefits, and expanded export market 
opportunities, and provide for the reduction or elimination of trade barriers that 
disproportionately impact small businesses; and 
(9) to promote universal ratification and full compliance with ILO Convention 
No. 182 Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination 
of the Worst Forms of Child Labor.107 
In addition to these general negotiating objectives, which leave room for 
considerable negotiating discretion, specific negotiating authority was 
incorporated for investment, labor and environmental objectives, as discussed 
below. 
2. Protection of Investment 
Provisions for protection of foreign investment in U.S. RTAs have been 
among the most controversial provisions.  As the Senate Report on TPA 
indicated, the objectives reflect an effort to reach a compromise between two 
conflicting goals: 
The negotiating objective on foreign investment reflects the [Senate Finance] 
Committee’s view that it is a priority for negotiators to seek agreements 
protecting the rights of U.S. investors abroad and ensuring the existence of an 
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. It also reflects the view that in 
entering into investment agreements, negotiators must seek to protect the 
interests of the United States as a potential defendant in investor-state dispute 
settlement. In other words, there ought to be a balance.  Protecting the rights of 
U.S. investors abroad should not come at the expense of making Federal, State 
and local laws and regulations unduly vulnerable to challenges by foreign 
investors.108 
The Senate Report also urged against future investment agreements that 
“confer on foreign investors in the United States a right to compensation for 
expropriation that differs substantially from the right to compensation for 
takings that U.S. citizens already enjoy.”109  The resulting negotiating authority 
text reflected these concerns and strove to achieve the following compromises: 
[T]he principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding foreign 
investment are to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting barriers to 
 
 107. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(a) (Supp. 2002). 
 108. S. REP. NO. 107-139, at 13 (2002). 
 109. Id. at 15. 
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foreign investment, while ensuring that foreign investors in the United States 
are not accorded greater substantive rights with respect to investment 
protections than United States investors in the United States, and to secure for 
investors important rights comparable to those that would be available under 
United States legal principles and practice, by— 
(A) reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle of national treatment: 
. . . . 
(D) seeking to establish standards for expropriation and compensation for 
expropriation, consistent with United States legal principles and practice; 
(E) seeking to establish standards for fair and equitable treatment consistent 
with United States legal principles and practice, including the principle of due 
process . . . .110 
The TPA’s attempted compromises failed to fully satisfy anyone.  The 
TPA provisions were criticized for undermining U.S. legislation and for failing 
to fully guarantee that foreign investors will be barred from receiving 
protection not available to U.S. firms.111  Others have argued that the new 
investment provisions weaken the protection for U.S. investors abroad.112  By 
explicitly limiting protection for foreign investors in the United States in the 
event of takings to the rights guaranteed to U.S. citizens, without referring to 
the minimum requirements of international law, the United States appears to be 
shifting to its own version of limiting responsibility to what is required under 
domestic legislation alone. 
3. Labor and the Environment 
The most controversial of all FTA-related discussions in the United States 
have proven to be over whether U.S. trade agreements should include 
provisions relating to labor and the environment.  Congressional and private 
opinions have varied widely, from opposing such provisions entirely to seeking 
assurances that any violations of trade or environmental standards are punished 
in the same manner as any other violations of the FTAs and that strict labor 
and environmental standards are included in the FTA texts.113 Many 
 
 110. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(3) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). 
 111. See Final Trade Package Further Weakens Limits on Investor Protections, 20 INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE (Aug. 2, 2002) (documenting various interest groups’ opposition to the TPA). 
 112. See David A. Gantz, The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the 
United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 679, 764–767 (2004) 
(discussing business community views on the new FTA provisions). 
 113. See, e.g., MARY JANE BOLLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., JORDAN-U.S. FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT: LABOR ISSUES, 2–4 (2001), available at  http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/ 
permalink/meta-crs-2030:1; Andrea N. Anderson, The United States Jordan Free Trade 
Agreement, United States Chile Free Trade Agreement and the United States Singapore Free 
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Republicans who found the language in TPA overly strong likely supported the 
compromise because of the perceived need of the Bush administration to have 
the necessary trade agreement negotiating authority.  The actual text favored 
the generally limited coverage of labor and the environment espoused by the 
Republicans (as in the Chile and Singapore FTAs) over the broader coverage 
preferred by some Democrats: 
The principal negotiating objectives of the United States with respect to 
labor and the environment are— 
(A) to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the United States does not 
fail to effectively enforce its environmental or labor laws, through a sustained 
or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between 
the United States and that party after entry into force of a trade agreement 
between those countries; 
(B) to recognize that parties to a trade agreement retain the right to exercise 
discretion with respect to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and 
compliance matters and to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources 
to enforcement with respect to other labor or environmental matters 
determined to have higher priorities, and to recognize that a country is 
effectively enforcing its laws if a course of action or inaction reflects a 
reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide decision 
regarding the allocation of resources, and no retaliation may be authorized 
based on the exercise of these rights or the right to establish domestic labor 
standards and levels of environmental protection; 
(C) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to promote 
respect for core labor standards114 . . . ; 
(D) to strengthen the capacity of United States trading partners to protect the 
environment through the promotion of sustainable development; 
(E) to reduce or eliminate government practices or policies that unduly 
threaten sustainable development; 
 
Trade Agreement: Advancement of Environmental Preservation?, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1221, 
1221–22 (2004); Marley L. Weiss, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back—Or Vice Versa: Labor 
Rights Under Free Trade Agreements from NAFTA, Through Jordan, via Chile, to Latin America, 
and Beyond, 37 U.S.F. L. Rev. 689, 689–701 (2003); Emily Harwood, Note, The Jordan Free 
Trade Agreement: Free Trade and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
509, 509 (2002). 
 114. “Core labor standards” means: 
(A) the right of association; (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (C) a 
prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (D) a minimum age for 
the employment of children; and (E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to 
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health. 
19 U.S.C. § 3813(6) (Supp. 2002). 
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(F) to seek market access, through the elimination of tariffs and nontariff 
barriers, for United States environmental technologies, goods, and services; 
and 
(G) to ensure that labor, environmental, health, or safety policies and practices 
of the parties to trade agreements with the United States do not arbitrarily or 
unjustifiably discriminate against United States exports or serve as disguised 
barriers to trade.115 
The limiting provisions in paragraphs A and B, in particular, are 
significant.  They (1) restrict the enforceable FTA obligations to enforcing a 
country’s own labor laws; (2) limit any dispute settlement actions to those that 
address a “sustained or recurring course of action or inaction,” rather than a 
single violation, regardless of how severe; and (3) preserve relatively broad 
legislative discretion on the part of FTA Parties, including the United States.116  
Thus, a change in national law to weaken environmental or labor provisions is 
not a violation of the Agreement.  Advocates for the explicit incorporation of 
internationally recognized core labor standards were not satisfied.  Rather, 
TPA’s vague wording allowed President Bush to incorporate language on labor 
issues in FTAs which has been unsatisfactory to many members of Congress, 
as the subsequent BTD changes indicate. 
The debate is reflected in the opposing positions of Democratic Senator 
Baucus and Republican Senator Grassley, both of whom acted as the Finance 
Committee Chairman in recent years.  Baucus objected to the Chile FTA 
because it did not meet the standard for labor rights provisions established in 
the Jordan FTA.117  In response, Grassley argued that “[s]ome members of 
Congress [i.e., Baucus] are even arguing that future agreements must follow 
the ‘Jordan Standard’ . . . .”118  Grassley had earlier contended that the TPA 
provisions were designed to preserve the flexibility of the Executive Branch to 
take into account the situations in individual FTA negotiating partners. 
The pro-labor, anti-FTA groups understood that the labor provisions 
included in most of the Bush administration FTAs, at least until the BPD, 
provided the U.S. government with considerably less leverage to encourage 
enforcement of labor rights than the provisions of the Generalized System of 
Preferences (permitting denial of GSP benefits for beneficiary developing 
countries that violate labor rights) that are effectively displaced when an FTA 
goes into force.119 
 
 115. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(11) (Supp. 2002). 
 116. Id. 
 117. 148 CONG. REC. 19,121–22 (2002) (statement of Sen. Baucus). 
 118. 148 CONG. REC. 17,588 (2002). 
 119. See, e.g., LABOR ADVISORY COMM. FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND TRADE POLICY, 
U.S. TRADE REP., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE ON THE U.S.-MOROCCO FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 4, (Apr. 6, 2004), available 
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As to the environment, what appears to be most lacking in the Bush 
administration FTAs, with the exception of DR-CAFTA, is a quasi-
independent NAFTA-style Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
(“CEC”), with a secretariat and a mandate to investigate citizen complaints.120  
In the author’s view, many environmental groups may have over-emphasized 
the importance of binding dispute settlement and trade sanctions as an effective 
means of dealing with environmental concerns.  Governmental attention to 
environmental and labor shortcomings of FTA parties in the future will likely 
depend more on the availability of an adequately funded independent review 
agency, such as the CEC, and on the willingness of the United States and its 
FTA partners to cooperate and provide adequate funding than on the unlikely 
prospect of arbitration followed by trade sanctions or monetary penalties. 
Similarly, the effectiveness of such labor provisions in FTAs, like the 
weaker ones in earlier U.S. FTAs and the “side” agreements in NAFTA,121 
depends mostly on the willingness of the U.S. Executive Branch to both 
commit sufficient funds, staff and attention to such efforts and to cooperate 
when the citizen complaints are filed against the United States rather than 
against the other Parties.  In other words, an administration with a high level of 
commitment to improving labor and environmental law enforcement at home 
and abroad will use the provisions more effectively than an administration that 
does not give such issues a high priority.  In either situation, dispute settlement 
under any FTA is comparatively rare, regardless of the subject of the dispute.  
Effectiveness does not mean seeking sanctions at every opportunity but, rather, 
taking advantage of the existence of the treaty obligations as a basis for 
periodic discussion, provision of technical assistance and, where necessary, the 
use of firm pressure to bring about changes in laws and national enforcement 
mechanisms. 
IV.  THE 2007 BIPARTISAN TRADE DEAL 
The BTD was negotiated by U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab and 
the congressional and Senate leadership for the principal purpose of obtaining 
 
at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/Reports/asset_upload_ 
file809_3122.pdf (asserting that the MFTA provisions are weaker than those provided under 
GSP).  See also 19 U.S.C. § 2463(b)(1)(G), (c) (2000) (setting out the scope of presidential 
authority to deny GSP benefits). 
 120. See Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Who We Are, http://www.cec.org/ 
who_we_are/index.cfm?varlan=english (last visited Aug. 4, 2008) (describing the mandate of the 
CEC under the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation). 
 121. See North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., opened for 
signature Sept. 8, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993), available at http://www.naalc.org/english/agree 
ment.shtml; North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 
14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993), available at http://www.cec.org/pubs_info_resources/law_ 
treat_agree/naaec/index.cfm?varlan=English. 
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the support of the Democratically controlled Congress and Senate for the four 
pending FTAs with Peru, Colombia, Panama and South Korea.122  With 
Democratic control of Congress beginning in January 2007, it soon became 
evident that the pending FTAs would require modifications to gain approval by 
Congress.123  The BTD, which effectively amends TPA, in certain respects 
covers six areas: labor; environment; intellectual property; investment; 
government procurement and security, including port security. The most 
significant elements relate to labor and the environment.  While the differences 
are far from revolutionary, they led directly to congressional approval of the 
Peru TPA once the BTD language had been used to modify the Peru PTPA as 
negotiated earlier.  It remains uncertain whether the BTD will be effective in 
bringing about congressional approval of pending FTAs with Colombia, 
Panama and South Korea in 2009 or thereafter.124 
A. Labor Issues 
The BTD contemplates an “[e]nforceable reciprocal obligation for the 
countries [including, of course, the United States] to adopt and maintain in 
their laws and practice the five basic internationally-recognized labor 
principles, as stated in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work” as well as acceptable working conditions.125  This contrasts 
with agreements such as the DR-CAFTA that lack the enforceable obligation 
but define “labor laws” with reference to a similarly worded list of 
“internationally recognized labor rights.”126 
In the PTPA the relationship between international labor rights and local 
law is now explicitly set out: 
1. Each Party shall adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and 
practices thereunder, the following rights, as stated in the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up (1998) (ILO 
Declaration): 
(a) freedom of association; 
(b) the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; 
(c) the elimination of all forms of compulsory or forced labor; 
 
 122. Gary G. Yerkey, Veroneau ‘Confident’ Deal Can Be Struck With Congress On Labor 
Provisions of FTAs, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 373 (2007). 
 123. Id. (discussing the efforts by U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab to reach 
agreement with Democrats on standards in trade agreements “which would pave the way for the 
FTAs with Columbia, Peru, and Panama to move forward in Congress . . .”); BTD, supra note 24. 
 124. See GANTZ, supra note 1, ch. 9 (discussing the agreements with Peru, Panama, Colombia 
and Korea). 
 125. BTD, supra note 24, at 1. 
 126. DR-CAFTA, supra note 13, art. 16.8. 
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(d) the effective abolition of child labor and, for purposes of this 
Agreement, a prohibition on the worst forms of child labor; and 
(e) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation. 
2. Neither Party shall waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or 
otherwise derogate from, its statutes or regulations implementing paragraph 1 
in a manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties, where the 
waiver or derogation would be inconsistent with a fundamental right set out in 
that paragraph.127 
Nevertheless, “[t]o establish a violation of an obligation under Article 
17.2.1 a Party must demonstrate that the other Party has failed to adopt or 
maintain a statute, regulation, or practice in a manner affecting trade or 
investment between the Parties.”128  Whether a Party maintains a statute or 
regulation “in a manner affecting trade or investment” is subject to some 
interpretation, which the panelists will presumably supply if and when a labor 
dispute is referred to dispute settlement under the binding arbitration 
provisions of Chapter 21 of the Peru FTA.129 
For a Party to comply with these new provisions, it “shall” incorporate the 
ILO core principles into national law; a Party no longer satisfies the 
requirements by “striving” to incorporate.  Thus, a violation of the ILO 
principles becomes ipso facto a violation of national labor laws, and another 
Party may seek enforcement of the obligation under the dispute settlement 
provisions of the Agreement. 
Even with the BTD modifications, significant limitations persist.  These 
limitations may serve to protect the United States and other parties from 
actions alleging a lack of labor rights enforcement.  Notably, as with the 
“affecting trade and investment” condition, “non-enforcement of labor 
obligations [must have] occurred through a sustained or recurring course of 
action or inaction.”130  Thus, individual violations are not actionable. 
Additional limitations include: (1) applicability of the provisions only to 
federal labor laws, (2) invocation of the dispute settlement provisions only by 
the government, and (3) panel decisions that are neither self-executing nor able 
to alter U.S. or other national law.131  It remains to be demonstrated that the 
BTD language as incorporated into the FTAs will significantly affect the 
observance of labor rights under the FTAs.  Still, at minimum, the language 
 
 127. Peru TPA, supra note 18, art. 17.2. 
 128. Id. art., 17.2 n.1. 
 129. See id. art. 17.2. 
 130. BTD, supra note 24, at 1. 
 131. Id. at 1–2. 
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provides a basis for Party action should a Party such as the United States be 
interested in such enforcement. 
Under the BTD, both fines and trade sanctions would be available for 
violations, “based on amount of trade injury.”132  Thus, as reflected in the new 
PTPA language the differing treatment between violations of the trade 
provisions of earlier FTAs, i.e., trade sanctions, and labor or environmental 
violations, i.e., fines, is eliminated.  Articles 21.15, Implementation of the 
Final Report, and 21.16, Non-Implementation-Suspension of Benefits, provide 
that the failure of a Party to comply with or to reach agreement on 
compensation may lead either to the suspension of trade benefits or to the 
imposition of a monetary fine in lieu of trade sanctions, whether or not the 
subject of the dispute is labor, the environment or something else. 
The BTD further specifies that FTA Parties may include in their 
government contracts requirements that suppliers must comply with core labor 
laws, including any applicable occupational health and safety requirements, in 
the country where either the good is produced or the services are performed.  
For example, a Peruvian supplier of goods to a government agency in the 
United Sates may be required to comply with core labor laws in Peru, and 
awards may presumably be challenged on the basis of a failure to comply.133 
B. Environmental Issues 
Under the BTD, a specific list of multilateral environmental agreements 
(“MEAs”) is to be incorporated into FTAs negotiated by the United States.134  
While such a list does not appear in recent FTAs, the list approach represents 
an expansion of NAFTA rather than a totally new innovation.  In the BTD, the 
incorporated MEAs include not only those listed in NAFTA, those relating to 
endangered species, protection of the ozone layer, control of trans-boundary 
movement of hazardous waste, and certain bilateral agreements between 
Canada, the United States and Mexico.135  In addition, the BTD also includes 
MEAs not listed in NAFTA, such as the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, the 
International Whaling Convention and the Convention on Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources.136 
The BTD, as implemented in the Peru TPA, provides: 
In the event of any inconsistency between a Party’s obligations under this 
Agreement and a covered [environmental] agreement, the Party shall seek to 
balance its obligations under both agreements, but this shall not preclude the 
Party from taking a particular measure to comply with its obligations under the 
 
 132. Id. at 2. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. NAFTA, supra note 9, art. 104. 
 136. BTD, supra note 24, at 2. 
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covered agreement, provided that the primary purpose of the measure is not to 
impose a disguised restriction on trade.137 
Also, the failure of an FTA Party to adhere to a listed MEA is a violation of the 
FTA that is subject to dispute settlement.138  In provisions derived from the 
BTD that are unique among U.S. FTAs, the Peru FTA incorporates detailed 
obligations on the part of Peru to control illegal logging.139 
The obligations are tightened by substituting “shall” for “strive” in 
enforcing environmental laws.  These and other environmental violations will 
be enforced in the same manner as other violations, subject not simply to 
monetary assessments but to fines and trade sanctions.140  Also, as in the case 
of labor, government procurement contracts may include provisions that 
promote environmental protection.141 
C. Investment 
Given the extensive changes in the investment provisions of U.S. FTAs 
required under the TPA language, one might have concluded that beginning 
with the Singapore and Chile FTAs no additional changes would be 
necessary.142  To date, there have been no investment disputes in post-NAFTA 
FTAs that have reached the stage of investor-state arbitration.143  Nevertheless, 
some in Congress apparently remain concerned that foreign investors bringing 
actions against the United States, or U.S. states, will receive better legal 
treatment than U.S. national investors bringing similar claims.  The latter do 
not have available international arbitration against the United States 
Government or its agencies, although they have full access to the U.S. court 
system. 
The result calls for a relatively minor fix.  While there is to be no change in 
the now-standard investment protection language, the preamble to the four new 
agreements has been changed to provide explicitly that foreign investors will 
not be accorded greater substantive rights than are afforded U.S. investors 
regarding investment protections within the United States.144  For example, in 
the PTPA, under the preamble’s language, the Parties: 
 
 137. Peru TPA, supra note 18, art.18.13.4.  This language is similar to that in NAFTA, supra 
note 9, art. 104. 
 138. Id. 
 139. BTD, supra note 24, at 3; Peru TPA, supra  note 18, art. 18.3.4, annex 18.3.4. 
 140. Id. at 2–3. 
 141. Id. at 4. 
 142. See, e.g., GANTZ, supra note 1, ch. 7. 
 143. As of March 2008, the arbitrators were being chosen for a dispute between a U.S. firm, 
Railroad Development Corp., and the Government of Guatemala.  Rossella Brevetti, Arbitration 
Panel in First CAFTA-DR Investor-State Case Awaits Arbitrator, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. 350 
(2008). 
 144. BTD, supra note 24, at 4. 
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AGREE that foreign investors are not hereby accorded greater substantive 
rights with respect to investment protections than domestic investors under 
domestic law where, as in the United States, protections of investor rights 
under domestic law equal or exceed those set forth in this Agreement . . . ;145 
As redacted, the language is considerably less troublesome to those in the 
United States favoring strong protection for foreign investment than the 
formulation in the BTD, itself.  It limits the applicability of domestic law to 
situations, explicitly including the United States, where protection of investor 
rights are allegedly equal to or greater than those set out in the Agreement, i.e., 
those provided by customary international law and the explicit rights under 
Section A of the investment chapter.146  The championing of domestic law is 
considerably less sweeping than the traditional “Calvo Clause” enshrined in 
many Latin American constitutions.  These clauses commonly provided that 
foreign investors were to be subject to the same legal rights as local citizens 
and were obligated to resolve disputes in local courts, although the unfortunate 
approach  in the BTD of asserting primacy of domestic law is similar.147 
One can reasonably argue that under U.S. law, foreign investors currently 
possess all the legal rights guaranteed by customary international law, 
including those explicitly afforded in Section A of FTA investment chapters, 
as do U.S. domestic investors under the U.S. Constitution.  Although some 
may disagree, there are undoubtedly some litigants against the U.S. 
government that personally would feel otherwise.  If there is no difference, this 
clause has no substantive impact.  It may be more troubling if and when 
applied on a reciprocal basis, by FTA partner governments defending against 
U.S. investors, if the governments assert that their local law also meets or 
exceeds the requirements of the particular FTA’s investment chapter. 
Presumably, in a blatant case of uncompensated expropriation, as has occurred 
recently in Venezuela for example,148 a tribunal would have no difficulty in 
dismissing the argument that protections under local law were no less 
significant than those provided under the investment chapter of the Agreement.  
In closer cases, such as an alleged regulatory taking, the language might give 
the arbitrators more pause. 
 
 145. Peru TPA, supra note 18, pmbl. 
 146. Id. art. 10. 
 147. See Michael J. Bond, The Americanization of Carlos Calvo, 22-8 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. 
REP. 19, 19 (2007) (comparing the Calvo Doctrine to current U.S. policy on foreign investment).  
The traditional Calvo Clause also barred resolution of investor-state disputes other than through 
domestic courts. Id. 
 148. See Steve Gelsi, Exxon Mobil’s Hard Line on Expropriation, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 14, 
2008), http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/exxon-mobil-take-hard-line/story.aspx?guid=% 
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Exxon’s production licenses). 
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D. Intellectual Property 
The language adopted in the intellectual property provisions of the BTD 
recognizes the need for both strong intellectual property protection for 
developed country FTA partners and for greater flexibility for those partners.  
Developing country members of the FTAs should not be forced to accept a 
level of intellectual property protection that goes well beyond WTO 
obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”).149  The focus of the BTD language is on pharmaceutical testing and 
the provisions in other recent FTAs that protect test data.150  Under the BTD, 
test data in FTA partners would not be protected for longer periods than exist 
in the United States.  Exceptions to normal intellectual property obligations 
would be allowed to protect public health.  Also, extension of patents where 
national patent offices have caused delays would be subject to flexibility, 
rather than mandated; and greater developing-country flexibility would be 
permitted in deciding how to deal with patent-infringing products.151  These 
measures will permit generic drugs to enter the market more rapidly in 
comparison to the earlier data exclusivity provisions.152 
Finally, the FTAs must explicitly indicate that their provisions do not 
affect FTA partner rights to take necessary public health measures consistent 
with those permitted in the WTO Doha Declaration and presumably 
subsequent WTO accords and any TRIP amendments relating to 
pharmaceuticals and public health.153 
E. Security 
The Bilateral Trade Deal requires newer FTAs to state explicitly that the 
“essential security” section, patterned after GATT Article XXI, can be invoked 
to override other FTA obligations, including, but not limited to, port services; 
and such action is not subject to the dispute settlement provisions, such as 
Chapter 21 of the PTPA.  The relevant language from the PTPA provides that 
“[f]or greater certainty, if a Party invokes Article 22.2, the national security 
provision, in an arbitral proceeding initiated under Chapter Ten (Investment) or 
 
 149. See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 
I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994). 
 150. See, e.g., DR-CAFTA, supra note 13, arts. 15.9.5, 15.10. 
 151. BTD, supra note 24, at 3. 
 152. See Rossella Brevetti, Democratic, GOP Lawmakers Reach Agreement with 
Administration on FTAs, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 674 (2007) (discussing the major features of the 
BTD, including those relating to pharmaceuticals). 
 153. See World Trade Organization, TRIPS and Public Health, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/trips_e/pharmpatent_e.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2008) (listing, inter alia, the 2001 Doha 
Declaration on Public Health and the 2005 Decision on the Amendment of the TRIPS 
Agreement). 
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Chapter Twenty-One (Dispute Settlement), the tribunal or panel hearing the 
matter shall find that the exception applies.”154  In other words, the tribunal has 
no discretion to second-guess the party invoking the national security 
exception.  This new language may reflect, in part, the absence of similar 
language in the GATT/WTO system, which has led to at least one difficult 
dilemma when the invocation of GATT Article XXI was challenged in the 
Dispute Settlement Body.155 
V.  TPAS WITH PERU, PANAMA, COLOMBIA AND SOUTH KOREA 
As discussed in Part IV, the result of the BTD was the incorporation of 
provisions reflecting the BTD into the agreements with Peru, Panama, 
Colombia and South Korea.  They have become the test cases that will 
ultimately determine whether the BTD will encourage the United States 
Congress to ratify them and to permit a future president to negotiate similar 
accords in the future when and if he has obtained new TPA. 
A discussion of the substantive provisions of these FTAs is beyond the 
scope of this article.156  Textual similarities are shared by all four and by other 
recent U.S. FTAs, such as DR-CAFTA, despite some differences reflecting 
Panama’s status as a service economy and Korea’s as a highly developed and 
integrated trade powerhouse. 
A. The Agreements 
1. Peru, Panama and Colombia 
The U.S. FTAs with Peru, Panama and Colombia apply to small Latin 
American nations with relatively limited capacity to export or to demand major 
changes in the standard U.S. FTA model.  For the U.S. economy as a whole, 
the trade benefits or costs are insignificant.  In contrast, for these Latin 
American economies, the expected economic development benefits are 
substantial.  Peruvian officials have estimated that the implementation of the 
FTA with Peru will add at least one percentage point to GDP growth, on top of 
a strong 8.2% GDP growth rate through September 2006.157  Colombia has 
similar expectations in terms of the economic benefits.  Political considerations 
for all partners have played a part—especially with Colombia, which is closely 
 
 154. Peru TPA, supra note 18, art. 22.2 n.2 (emphasis added). 
 155. See Request for Consultations by the European Communities, United States–The Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WT/DS38/1 (May 3, 1996), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds38_e.htm. 
 156. See GANTZ, supra note 1, ch. 9. 
 157. Lucien O. Chauvin, Peru Welcomes Senate Passage of Free Trade Pact with United 
States, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 1776 (2007). 
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allied with the United States militarily due to the billions of dollars the United 
States has contributed to drug eradication there.158 
The focus of the Panama FTA is on services more than trade in goods, 
although the latter play an important role in the bilateral relationship.  
Panama’s economy is eighty percent service-based, with much of this relating 
to the Panama Canal159 and international banking.  The United States is in the 
unusual position of maintaining a trade in goods surplus with Panama, $2.3 
billion on $3 billion worth of exports in 2006.160  Some ninety-six percent of 
Panama’s exports to the United States enter duty-free under Caribbean Basin 
Initiative preferences, yet most U.S. goods are subject to Panama’s seven 
percent MFN tariff.161  Most U.S. agricultural products will enter Panama 
duty-free at the outset of the Agreement, although there will be phase-in 
periods of up to fifteen years for some products. 
For the United States, a principal objective of the Panama FTA is to 
improve U.S. market access for services, through expanded rights of 
establishment and better regulatory transparency, along with elimination of 
restrictions on investment in retail trade, better access to contracting related to 
the Panama Canal and improved access to professional services.162  Access for 
U.S. firms to bidding on the $5 billion plus canal expansion project163 was 
evidently a key factor in the U.S. decision to conclude the FTA. 
 
 158. Letter from Jess T. Ford, United States General Accounting Office, Drug Control: Coca 
Cultivation and Eradication Estimates in Columbia, (Jan. 8, 2003), available at 
http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/d03319r.pdf.  See Gary G. Yerkey, Colombia to Make All-
Out Bid in U.S. Visits To Win Congressional Endorsement of FTA, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 1302 
(2007) (quoting Colombian President Uribe’s statements that congressional failure to approve the 
FTA would mean that the United States was turning its back on a close ally in the region). 
 159. Press Release, U.S. Trade Rep., U.S. and Panama Complete Trade Promotion Agreement 
Negotiations (Dec. 19, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_ 
Releases/2006/December/US_Panama_Complete_Trade_Promotion_Agreement_Negotiations_pr
inter.html [hereinafter USTR Statement]. 
 160. ADVISORY COMM. FOR TRADE POLICY & NEGOTIATIONS, U.S. TRADE REP., REPORT TO 
THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS, AND THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE ON THE 
U.S.-PANAMA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 2 (2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_ 
Agreements/Bilateral/Panama_FTA/Reports/Section_Index.html. 
 161. Id. at 3. 
 162. Id. at 3–4.  See generally Panama TPA, supra note 20, ch. 11. 
 163. See Panama Plans Huge Canal Expansion; Panama Has Announced an Ambitious 
$5.3bn (£2.9bn) Plan to Widen its Famous Canal to Handle a New Generation of Giant 
Container Ships, BBC NEWS, Apr. 25, 2006, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/ 
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4941126.stm (indicating the Panamanian view that expansion is 
necessary to maintain the Canal’s status as a major route for global cargo). 
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2. U.S.-Korean FTA (KORUS) 
The economic relationship between the United States and Korea is far 
more substantial than with Peru, Panama and Colombia, reflecting the fact that 
Korea is the world’s tenth-largest economy.164  U.S.-Korean trade is roughly 
$80 billion per year, twice that with the DR-CAFTA group as a whole and 
more than any other FTA except NAFTA. The security alliance, with 
thousands of U.S. troops still stationed in Korea, reflects “a half century of 
friendship and cooperation.”165  The USITC, reporting on the likely effects of 
KORUS, noted that for most products traded between Korea and the United 
States, the U.S. imports are subject to lower tariffs and fewer quotas than vice 
versa.166  The USITC concluded that U.S. GDP would increase by about $10 
billion to $12 billion as a result of the Agreement, two-way trade would 
increase by about $16 billion to $18 billion, and that U.S. services exports 
would increase because of Korea’s market access, national treatment and 
transparency obligations going beyond Korea’s GATS obligations.  The 
overall impact on U.S. output and employment, however, would be 
negligible.167 
Despite the relatively rosy picture painted by the USITC, trade with Korea 
is highly sensitive in several areas.  These areas include Korean restrictions on 
U.S. agricultural products, beef and rice in particular.  Since the United States 
did not demand during negotiations that Korea open its rice market, beef is a 
centerpiece of the FTA to the extent that it covers agriculture.  The U.S. beef 
industry sees rising meat consumption in Korea as an opportunity to increase 
its beef exports significantly.  Unfortunately, until mid-2008, Korea continued 
to block all U.S. beef shipments despite the fact that concerns over Mad-Cow 
Disease in 2004 had been resolved in most other jurisdictions.  The U.S. beef 
industry and its many supporters in Congress and the Bush administration are 
likely to continue to oppose KORUS “until commercially viable beef trade is 
occurring based on the internationally recognized guidelines established by the 
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).”168 
 
 164. Press Release, U.S. Trade Rep., United States and the Republic of Korea Sign Landmark 
Free Trade Agreement, June 30, 2007, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/ 
Press_Releases/2007/June/United_States_the_Republic_of_Korea_Sign_Lmark_Free_Trade_ 
Agreement_printer.html. 
 165. Id. 
 166. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, U.S.-KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: POTENTIAL 
ECONOMY-WIDE AND SELECTED SECTORAL EFFECTS, at xvii (2007), available at http://hot 
docs.usitc.gov/docs/pubs/2104f/pub3949.pdf. 
 167. Id. 
 168. ANIMAL & ANIMAL PRODS. AGRIC. TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMM., U.S. TRADE REP., 
ANIMAL AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE 
CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE ON US-KOREAN FREE TRADE 
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Commitments by Korean President Lee Myung-bak to President Bush to 
reopen the Korean market to U.S. beef were met with such widespread 
political opposition in Korea that President Lee was effectively forced to 
withdraw the assurances.169  In June 2008, Korea and the United States 
confirmed a protocol in which Korea agreed to lift restrictions on beef imports 
from cattle less than thirty months old, a dividing line believed to further 
reduce the risk of Mad-Cow Disease.170  It remains unclear at this writing 
whether President Lee will be able to implement fully the supplementary 
agreement domestically or whether the limitations it incorporates will be 
acceptable to the Congress and Senate.171  As of early 2009, the signs are 
positive. 
Provisions of KORUS that will eliminate the current 2.5% MFN tariff on 
autos with engines of 3.0 liters or less are also opposed by the U.S. auto 
industry and its congressional supporters for obvious reasons given the 
precarious economic status of the “Big Three.”  Opponents fear that without 
the tariff, Korea will expand the current 700,000 annual automobile exports, 
worth some $10 billion.  Substantial increases are anticipated in small truck 
exports as the current twenty-five percent MFN tariff is phased out over ten 
years.  The U.S. auto producers manage to export to Korea no more than a few 
thousand autos worth $503 million per year at an average eight percent MFN 
tariff.172  Regardless of how one may criticize the products or marketing of the 
U.S. “Big Three” in Korea, logic suggests that the disparity must be due at 
least in part to non-tariff barriers.173 
 
AGREEMENT 1 (2007), available at  http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/ 
Republic_of_Korea_FTA/Reports/asset_upload_file944_12768.pdf. 
 169. Blaine Harden, In S. Korea, Regrets and Assurances on U.S. Beef, WASH. POST, May 23, 
2008, at A10. 
 170. Press Release, U.S. Trade Rep., USTR Confirms Korea’s Announcement on U.S. Beef, 
June 21, 2008, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2008/ 
June/asset_upload_file711_14948.pdf. 
 171. See generally Amy Tsui, USTR Welcomes Korean Publication of Rules For Importing 
U.S. Beef Under Protocol, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. 989 (2008) (reporting unhappiness with the 
accord on the part of Senate Finance Committee Chair Max Baucus). 
 172. OFFICE OF TRADE POLICY ANALYSIS, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., U.S.-KOREA FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT MARKET ACCESS RESULTS: AUTOS AND AUTO PARTS 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/tradepolicy/sectorreports/korea_automotives.pdf; INDUS. TRADE 
ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMOTIVE EQUIP. & CAPITAL GOODS, U.S. TRADE REP., ITAC 2 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS, AND THE UNITED STATES 
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE ON THE US-KOREA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Republic_of_Korea_FTA/Reports/asset_
upload_file532_12770.pdf. 
 173. See Lawmakers, Labor Leaders Denounce U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement,  24 
INT’L TRADE REP. 883 (2007) (reporting on the “unfairness” of Korean restrictions on U.S. autos 
and beef, and stringent restrictions on imports of rice); U.S. TRADE REP., FREE TRADE WITH 
KOREA, SUMMARY OF THE KORUS FTA 1–2 (2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/ 
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A third key aspect of the agreement, politically sensitive for both the 
United States and Korea, and considered a national security issue for the 
United States, is the status of the North Korean Kaesong Industrial Complex 
located near the North Korea-South Korea border.  The treatment of Kaesong 
under KORUS is vague; it simply creates a committee to study the issue.174  
Congressional leaders have demanded, with some justification, that products 
with a high level of North Korean content, manufactured or assembled on 
North Korean soil, be precluded from the benefits of the FTA unless both the 
United States and Korean Government are in full agreement on timing and 
conditions. 
B. Congressional Action? 
The risks of predicting when and if these pending agreements, except for 
the PTPA, might be approved by Congress are substantial given the factors 
discussed earlier.  Consequently, this section is largely restricted to pointing 
out any additional considerations that have permitted or discouraged approval 
to date. 
1. Peru TPA 
Peru proved to be the easy case of the four and certainly the only “slam 
dunk” among FTAs with any Latin American nation.  It was brought to a vote 
in Congress first.175  The FTA passed the Democratically-controlled House of 
Representatives by a vote of 285-132, or more than two-thirds, with 109 House 
Democrats voting affirmatively, although more than half of the congressional 
Democrats still voted “no.”176  In contrast, several years earlier, DR-CAFTA 
passed the Republican-controlled House by only two votes.177  A few weeks 
later, the vote in the Senate on the PTPA was 77-18.178 
A number of factors converged to bring about this result.  First, the 
Peruvian Government made extensive efforts to convince members of 
 
Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2007/asset_upload_file811_11034.pdf (discussing improved auto 
and agricultural market access for U.S. goods). 
 174. KORUS, supra note 21, annex 22-B. 
 175. Gary G. Yerkey, Congress Set to Move on Peru FTA as Peruvian President Touts 
Benefits, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 1302 (2007) (quoting Rep. Joseph Crowley (D-N.Y.)). 
 176. Rossella Brevetti, House Approves Peru FTA Bill; 116 Democrats Vote Against 
Measure, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 1620 (2007) (showing that a larger number of Democrats voted 
against the FTA). 
 177. OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. H.R., FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL CALL 443 (2005), 
available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2005/roll443.xml (showing that the vote was 217-215, 
with only 15 Democrats in support). 
 178. Rossella Brevetti, Senate Passes U.S.-Peru FTA Bill, Clearing Measure for Bush’s 
Signature, 24 INT’L TRADE REP. 1735 (2007). 
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Congress during numerous visits to Peru179 that Peru was serious about 
enacting labor and environmental legislation consistent with its revised 
obligations under the PTPA.  Secondly, some Democrats wished to show that 
they were not entirely anti-trade and perhaps wanted to avoid the embarrassing 
two-vote margin in the House when the DR-CAFTA was approved.180  The 
most significant factor was undoubtedly the BTD.  This, the first concrete 
result of the BTD, plus Peruvian cooperation in changing not only the PTPA 
but in making specific commitments regarding new legislation made it possible 
for the House leadership to endorse the PTPA as a “New Deal for International 
Trade and Workers”: 
  On May 10, House Democrats accomplished an historic breakthrough on 
trade by amending pending U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) with Peru and 
Panama to incorporate a fully enforceable commitment that countries adopt 
and enforce the five basic international labor standards, subject to the same 
dispute settlement mechanism and remedies as other FTA obligations. 
  Since then, we have undertaken discussions with Peru regarding 
implementation of these obligations . . . . 
  [W]e have continued to work with representatives of the Peruvian 
Government on implementation of the announced changes, and concluded 
discussions last week . . . . With the changes and the FTA, the United States 
now has a framework to bring about Peru’s compliance with basic 
international labor standards. 
  House Democrats came together to oppose the U.S.-Central America FTA 
(CAFTA) precisely because that agreement did not incorporate basic workers’ 
rights as a key instrument to spread the benefits of expanded trade.  This is not 
the case with the Peru FTA, which includes the international workers rights 
standard for which we have been fighting. Knowing trade is an issue about 
which there are differing perspectives, we urge you to carefully consider what 
has been accomplished with this agreement, and the importance of broad 
support within our ranks.181 
One may speculate as to how much easier it might have been for the Bush 
administration to enact TPA and obtain the approval of FTAs earlier had there 
been some effort from 2002–2006 by the Republican House leadership to reach 
out to the generally pro-trade Democrats in both houses of Congress.  Such 
efforts might have achieved a compromise much sooner on labor and 
 
 179. Lucien O. Chauvin, Peru’s Government Proposes Labor Measures to Seal 
Congressional Passage in U.S. of FTA,  24 INT’L TRADE REP. 1181 (2007). 
 180. Yerkey, supra note 175 (quoting Rep. Greg Meeks (D-N.Y.)). 
 181. Letter from Rep. Charles B. Rangel, Chairman, U.S. H.R. Comm. on Ways & Means & 
Rep. Sander M. Levin, Chairman, Subcomm. on Trade, U.S. H.R. Comm. on Ways & Means, to 
the Democratic Members of the H.R. (Sept. 18, 2007). 
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environmental issues that likely would have brought several dozen more 
Democratic votes in favor of such FTAs as DR-CAFTA without undermining 
the trade benefits in any real sense. 
Even with the BTD, there were critics in both the United States and Peru.  
Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch accused the Democratic congressional 
leadership for failing to assure that the Peruvian labor legislation was enacted 
before Congress approved the PTPA.182 A Peruvian labor leader made 
essentially the same criticism, alleging that once the FTA had been enacted, 
Peru would renege on its labor law commitments.183 
More than a year passed before the Agreement entered into force on 
February 1, 2009, despite last-minute objections.184  Peruvian officials 
indicated that more than seventy laws and other norms had to be changed in 
order for Peru to comply with its obligations under the PTPA,185 and it is 
evident in retrospect that the United States required that essentially all such 
changes be made before the United States was willing to permit the Agreement 
to take effect. 
The success of negotiations with the United States has contributed to 
Peruvian confidence in undertaking additional FTA negotiations.  Those with 
China are modeled along the lines of an earlier Chinese FTA with Chile.  A 
Peruvian government official noted, with admirable understatement, that 
“China is not like the United States.  It does not have a Congress like that in 
the United States.”186 
2. Panama and Colombia TPAs 
Ironically, the factors that have discouraged prompt congressional action 
on the Panama TPA and Colombia TPA have little to do with the contents of 
the agreements themselves and only peripherally with the BTD.  The rationale 
for delay in both situations has been political, although hardly irrational. 
With Panama, the problem was that the president of the Panamanian 
National Assembly until September 2008, Pedro Miguel González Pinzón, is 
under indictment in the United States for the murder of an American 
serviceman in 1992.  Until González’s term expired in September 2008, it was 
highly unlikely that the President would send the Panama TPA to Congress for 
 
 182. Rossella Brevetti, Labor Leader Charges that Peru Will Not Implement FTA Promises, 
24 INT’L TRADE REP. 1326 (2007) (quoting Lori Wallach, Director, Public Citizen’s Global 
Trade Watch). 
 183. Id. (quoting Julio Cesar Bazán, President, Confederación Unitaria de Trabajadores). 
 184. Schwab Certifies Peru FTA Despite Labor Complaints from Key Democrats, 27 INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE (Jan. 23, 2009). 
 185. Chauvin, supra note 157. 
 186. Lucien O. Chauvin, Peru Set to Begin Free Trade Talks With China, Marking Improving 
Relations, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. 83 (2008). 
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approval.187  When González stepped down, no reason remained to delay 
congressional action, except perhaps the general reluctance of the Congress to 
consider a trade agreement only a few months before a national election and 
the Bush administration’s insistence that Colombia be considered despite lack 
of congressional support.188  There was also an argument for prompt action 
regarding Panama on the U.S. side; a long delay would likely make it more 
difficult for American firms to bid successfully on various pieces of the Canal 
expansion project. 
The issue with Colombia was much more complex.  House Speaker Nancy 
Pelosi asserted the existence of “widespread ‘bipartisan concern’” among 
members of Congress relating to periodic violence against labor leaders in 
Colombia.  There also has been a belief in Congress and elsewhere that the 
violence was perpetrated at least in part because of relationships between 
officials in the Colombian Government and paramilitary forces that are 
responsible for the violence.189  Here, unlike the situation with Panama, there is 
no obvious solution.  Those opposed to the agreement in Congress have set no 
clear goals as to what Colombian government officials must do in order to 
satisfy U.S. congressional opponents.190 Even speaking with Colombian 
authorities about the TPA is suspect; a top Clinton aide was fired for meeting 
with the Colombian ambassador in early April.191 
The fact that the opposition is led by U.S. labor unions and their supporters 
in Congress, a group that is typically opposed to trade agreements with anyone 
under any circumstances, makes it difficult to assess the legitimacy of the 
opposition. There is little doubt, however, that U.S. union concerns over 
serious violence against members of labor unions, among other groups, in 
Colombia are well-founded.  The action of Colombian authorities in May 2008 
to turn over a large group of suspected terrorists and drug traffickers for trial in 
the United States did not satisfy congressional opponents even though 
terrorists are thought to be responsible for some of the violence against union 
officials.192 
 
 187. See generally Rossella Brevetti, Colombia, Panama Free Trade Agreements Face 
Challenges in 2008, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. 96 (2008) (discussing the obstacles to U.S. approval of 
the Panama and Colombia TPAs). 
 188. See Steve Charnovitz, The Bush-Schwab Policy on the Colombia FTA Has Failed 
Miserably, ICTSD, Vol. 12, no. 6, Dec. 2008, available at http://ictsd.net/i/news/bridges/38010. 
 189. Gary G. Yerkey, Democratic Leaders Reject Bush Call for Early Vote on Colombia Free 
Trade Pact, 25 INT’L TRADE REP. 165 (2008). 
 190. Id. (referring to complaints by U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab). 
 191. Anne E. Kornblut & Dan Balz, Clinton’s Chief Strategist Steps Down, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 7, 2008, at A1 (noting that Mark J. Penn was fired after a meeting with the Colombian 
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3. KORUS 
As of January 2009, it seemed unlikely that the Obama administration 
would seek, nor the Congress grant, approval of KORUS in the foreseeable 
future.  The crisis facing the U.S. auto industry discourages early action on an 
Agreement that might encourage additional imports of foreign autos in 
competition with U.S. producers.  Eventually, the Kaesong Industrial Zone 
concerns must also be resolved.  Thus, Congress has at least three excuses for 
not acting.  Given the magnitude of the trade between the two nations and the 
potential for expansion, along with the continuing national security 
relationship, it is not unreasonable to assume that KORUS will eventually be 
approved, but probably not during 2009 and not without some further 
negotiations or side letters to address outstanding issues. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The discussion over whether the negotiating objectives of the 2002 TPA, 
as modified by the BTD, have been or can be achieved continues.  While the 
success of the BTD to date is not encouraging, the BTD is likely to serve as a 
starting point when and if the TPA renewal discussions commence, especially 
given President Obama’s commitment to strong labor and environmental 
enforcement during the campaign and continuing union support in the White 
House and Congress.  However, given the substantial opposition of at least half 
the Democrats in Congress to trade agreements, one cannot assume that 
President Obama will have an easy time of negotiating new TPA with 
Congress.  Still, in the author’s view, a failure to promptly seek, negotiate and 
implement TPA will destroy the United States’ ability to participate 
meaningfully in trade negotiations, either in Geneva or regionally, a situation 
that no responsible president (nor congressional leadership) should welcome. 
As suggested earlier, the impact of this U.S. trade debate goes well beyond 
rhetoric and well beyond U.S. shores.  U.S. international economic policy and 
leadership on global economic issues, and the credibility it does or does not 
generate, significantly affect broader U.S. interests in the world, including 
maintenance of world peace and security, strengthening of democratic 
institutions and support of economic development and the rule of law.  FTAs 
with developing countries in particular provide a means of helping those 
countries with virtually no harm to U.S. interests.  Agreements with more 
substantial economies that are potential destinations for a higher volume of 
exports, such as Korea, promise new U.S. domestic investment and job 
creation.  Thus, renunciation of the trade agreement tool would be extremely 
unfortunate for all concerned and would likely lead to a further undermining of 
U.S. influence in the world in international economic matters and otherwise. 
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